 |
L’Eclaireur est financé exclusivement par les abonnements de ses lecteurs. L’Eclaireur ne fait appel à aucune subvention publique ou privée, aucun abattement fiscal, aucune publicités ou sponsoring, aucuns dons ni financement participatif. Pour soutenir notre travail, nous n’avons que vous. Merci de votre fidélité.
[ Transcript] This is Happening in the EU
Russia–Ukraine war, freedom of expression, the European Union: a Conversation with Fernand Kartheiser, Member of the European Parliament.
|
| |||||||||||||||
 |
This article is the English transcription of the interview below.
 |
|
Can one still speak freely in Europe? Can freedom of expression itself still be freely criticised — especially when it comes to the Russia–Ukraine war? These are the questions we put to Fernand Kartheiser, a Luxembourgish Member of the European Parliament.
If we are discussing these issues with him, it is because of his long diplomatic career, his deep familiarity with the inner workings of international relations — and also because, despite the sanctions imposed on Russia, he has continued to speak with Russian officials. Kartheiser is one of the very few elected officials to publicly and fully uphold a dissenting stance, at a high political cost : he was excluded from his political group in the European Parliament.
The Luxembourgish MEP stands at the crossroads of two crucial issues: the position and role of the European Union in the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the freedom of expression. More, the freedoms.
“The rule of law within the European Union has become a political instrument,” says Fernand Kartheiser. We spoke with him.
L'ÉCLAIREUR is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
L’Eclaireur - Good morning, Mr. Kartheiser, and thank you for taking the time to join us today.
Your perspective is especially valuable at the intersection of two increasingly intertwined challenges facing the European Union: its strategic approach to the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the broader state of fundamental rights and freedoms—including freedom of expression, opinion, and movement—within the Union itself. These domains are no longer isolated; their dynamics increasingly influence one another, with implications for the EU’s coherence, security posture, and normative credibility.
To begin, could you please introduce yourself briefly and outline the key stages of your professional trajectory prior to entering elected politics?
Fernand Kartheiser - Good morning, and thank you for your interest in my rather modest self! I do have a long professional background — which also means I am no longer particularly young; I am 66 years old. I began my career as an army officer. After completing my studies, I spent many years in the military, gaining practical experience in various security and defense matters.
I then became a career diplomat for about twenty years, serving as ambassador in several European countries, including Greece, which was particularly significant from an international security perspective. After my diplomatic career, I was elected to the Luxembourgish national parliament, where I served for fifteen consecutive years, consistently sitting on the foreign affairs and security committees.
Finally, in 2024, I was elected for the first time to the European Parliament. Overall, my professional life has given me extensive experience in security matters, as well as in foreign policy and diplomacy.
L’Eclaireur - Drawing from your extensive experience, what core lessons have you drawn about the nature of international relations, and particularly about the practice of diplomacy? Does your background lead you to the view that sustained communication remains essential, even across deep lines of conflict—perhaps, as some traditions of diplomacy hold, that one must always maintain channels of dialogue, even with adversaries?
Fernand Kartheiser - Absolutely. I believe the first lesson one learns is respect. When you do not know a country well, there is a natural tendency to have a somewhat distorted view of its realities and to misunderstand how decisions are made. By talking to people and understanding cultural differences, however, one can gain a much clearer perspective.
As an ambassador, I was posted in Europe — in Greece, Romania, and Cyprus — in a region shaped by recurring crises. Choosing to be a diplomat, with the mission of fostering good relations while defending national interests, requires building trust with counterparts.
This is invaluable. You learn to present yourself in a non-offensive way, with a genuine willingness to understand the other side. In my view, that is extremely important.
Today in Europe, we see the opposite. Dialogue has broken down, understanding is rare, and positions are fixed and inflexible. We attempt to impose our views on adversaries rather than engage with them.
I am deeply convinced that this approach leads nowhere. Current developments already show this is a fundamental error. As our alliance system begins to weaken, people are realizing it was a mistake not to maintain good relations with all of the EU’s neighbors.
L’Eclaireur - Given the value of dialogue even with adversaries: does the EU still maintain any meaningful diplomatic contacts with Russia ?
Fernand Kartheiser - In fact, when it comes to Russia, our rhetoric is quite belligerent, yet diplomatic relations have never been completely severed. We are not in a state of official war. People speak as if there were a conflict, but from a legal standpoint, under international law, we remain at peace with Russia — and this is an important point to emphasize.
We still have ambassadors on the ground, although in practice they do very little. They communicate mostly among themselves rather than engaging with the Russians. Formally, however, diplomatic relations do exist. The channel remains open, even if it is only sparsely used in today’s interactions.
What I have sought, and continue to seek, is to compensate for this situation by maintaining political contacts — at a time when official political relations no longer exist between most EU member states, and indeed between the European Union itself, and Russia. I make a particular effort to stay in touch with colleagues from the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament.
L’Eclaireur - Had you already known any of these individuals from your earlier diplomatic or professional career?
Fernand Kartheiser - No, I had no prior relationship with the State Duma, and I was never an ambassador to Russia. In fact, I sought to establish contacts precisely at the moment when all other channels of communication had gradually collapsed, when all previous contacts had been severed. It was at that critical moment, in my view, that intervention became necessary.
That is what I did — to try to preserve at least some lines of communication. From the very beginning, I was convinced that the European Union’s approach would lead to a dead end, and I believed it was essential to maintain contacts so that, when the time came, we could find a way out and make use of the relationships that had been established to restore at least a working connection.
I do not wish to go further at this stage, because under the current circumstances, rebuilding trust with our Russian interlocutors is extremely difficult. I fully understand their perspective — the way we treat them is far from ideal. Yet, through these contacts between the European Parliament — or even just a few European parliamentarians — and the State Duma, we at least maintain a possible avenue, a potential bridge, to reconnect once the current crisis comes to an end.
L’Eclaireur - Your profile stands out among MEPs due to your diplomatic and military background, but also because of recurring media portrayals describing you—variously—as a double agent or the subject of a double-agent accusation. Could you briefly clarify the facts surrounding that period?
Fernand Kartheiser - In fact, I was an army officer, and during the Cold War, at a certain point, I was approached. I quickly understood that the contact came from a Russian intelligence service. At the time, I believed it was the KGB, although it later turned out to be the GRU — the Russian military intelligence service — something I only learned afterwards.
I realised that this service was attempting to recruit me. As soon as this became clear, I immediately informed my own authorities, namely the Luxembourg intelligence service. The Luxembourg state intelligence service then passed the information on to the CIA. The CIA subsequently asked me to do something quite specific: to appear to go along with the recruitment attempt, to allow myself, in effect, to be recruited by Russian military intelligence, while in reality working for them.
That is how it unfolded. The Russian service sought to contact and recruit me, and I entered into the process because the CIA requested it, with the full agreement of my national authorities. In practice, I was therefore working for the CIA and for my own country.
It was a very typical Cold War episode — rare, certainly, and also personally fascinating. After all, not many people are given the opportunity to enter the world of intelligence in this way. It was a situation that arose, and as an officer, I felt it was my patriotic duty to assume that role. And that is what I did.
L’Eclaireur - Returning to your current work as an MEP: you have traveled to Russia on several occasions for informal discussions, undertaken on your own initiative rather than in any official capacity. What motivated these visits? Were they intended, in part, to demonstrate that a willingness to maintain dialogue persists among at least some Members of the European Parliament?
Fernand Kartheiser - Yes. Why? That’s a very good question. Because I already felt that everything we were doing — at least that was my impression, and of course it can be debated — was profoundly dishonest.
Dishonest because the entire Ukraine crisis has always been presented here in the European Parliament, and more broadly to public opinion, as an unprovoked and unjustified Russian aggression. This terminology was invented by the Atlantic Alliance and quickly taken up by all the media; it became the official narrative.
But anyone who looks closely at the situation in Ukraine understands very well that this is far from the whole story. From the very beginning, I knew perfectly well that the conflict was linked to NATO’s eastward expansion, that Russia had made numerous proposals for negotiation before the outbreak of hostilities, that Ukraine was experiencing a surge of extreme nationalism, and that Russian-speaking populations were being shelled — populations who were not separatists at first, but simply wanted to continue speaking their language, which became impossible after the 2014 coup.
So, the situation in Ukraine was extremely complex, and the West is far from blameless. Yet officially, the narrative presented was that of an unprovoked Russian aggression. That was a lie, and it remains a lie.
I do not accept lies. I oppose them because I want, as far as possible, to preserve intellectual honesty. I also feel a deep sense of gratitude for what the Russians have done for Europe and our freedom. We must not forget that the Soviet Union lost 20 million people simply in the fight against Nazism. They contributed greatly to our liberation.
There is also a broader debt of gratitude. As a Luxembourger, I feel several such debts — Russia has helped us at various moments in our history — but I will not go into that now.
So I have never accepted that the entire responsibility for the Ukrainian conflict should be placed on Russia alone. There is, of course, responsibility, but it is far from the only one, and I would even say it is not the greatest. I believe that Ukraine itself, along with those in the West who sought NATO expansion, bear a greater responsibility for the events that unfolded. For me, this is fundamentally a matter of honesty.
When I went to Moscow, one of my interlocutors — a very impressive man, a diplomat who is now a deputy in the Federation Council, the upper chamber — asked me why I had come. He understood perfectly well that my visit was not viewed favorably in the West.
I told him that if I had not come, I would have committed a breach of friendship. It was quite moving, I must say — truly moving — because he looked at me and then waived the interpreter. Normally, everyone speaks their own language or an official language of their choice; he speaks Russian, of course.
He immediately dispensed with interpretation, and we spoke directly. I believe it was even in French, if I recall correctly — I’m not sure — but many Russians speak French very well. We had established a relationship of trust.
By doing so, he was signaling that we could speak openly — and we did. In my discussions in Moscow, I raised all the difficult issues. I did not want to go there merely to express understanding; I wanted to address the hard questions as well — war crimes, for example, and the cases of children who, according to some reports, had been forcibly taken to Russia. I raised all of these issues to show the Russians that I was open to dialogue but also willing to confront difficult matters.
Their response was excellent — very, very good. They were never irritated; they tried to answer everything. They were always polite and courteous.
So for anyone who claims it is impossible to talk with the Russians, that is simply false. The list of issues I discussed with them was extensive, and at no point did they refuse to engage or provide answers.
I also raised human rights issues in Russia. Before my trip, I had been contacted by several religious communities who wanted me to convey their concerns, which I did. Not everything is perfect in Russia regarding human rights and democracy, which we also observe in this vast country. They listened and took note. There was never the slightest problem in raising these issues.
I continue this dialogue with the State Duma. Our conversations remain polite and cordial. They want to show that they are still interested in engaging with us. We can discuss any issue; they always try to answer and remain open.
So to all those who claim that one cannot speak with Putin or with other Russian officials, I say: that is not true.
L’Eclaireur - How is your initiative to travel to Russia and engage in these informal discussions perceived in Brussels and Strasbourg?
Fernand Kartheiser - Every time I receive feedback, it is negative. Recently, for example, a Vice-President of the European Parliament told me that it is impossible to speak with sanctioned individuals, because all of these people have been sanctioned by the European Union for having supported, as they put it, the invasion of Ukraine or the Ukrainian conflict.
So in the end, everyone is sanctioned. The media are sanctioned as well, which, in my view, violates the agreements we reached with Russia in 1999 at the Istanbul Conference. There is an article in the conclusions of that OSCE conference — Article 26 — in which we agreed to grant our respective media full freedom in each other’s countries.
There was, therefore, a very significant openness — and all of that was abruptly ended by decisions of the European Union. I am told that I cannot speak to Russian media, that I cannot go there, that I must not speak to deputies because they are all sanctioned.
But I simply ignore all of that. I choose to disregard these positions, which, as I have said, strike me as dishonest and unconstructive. So of course I speak to Russian media. Almost every week I give an interview or make an appearance, either in the Russian press or on Russian television. I am asked for my opinion, and I give it — just as we are speaking now.
I make absolutely no distinction between Russian media and French, Swiss, or any other media, because I see no reason to do so. Sometimes — when I watch Russian programs from time to time — they are far more interesting than what we see elsewhere, because they occasionally have the courage to critically examine their own positions, which always surprises me.
In fact, watching Russian media is extremely interesting. I regret, somewhat, that this is no longer widely possible. It is also enriching to see the viewpoints of other countries, to observe how journalists elsewhere present the news.
The interruption of RT, Sputnik, and similar outlets was deliberate. Watching the media of an “adversary,” if you will, can lead people to ask questions. That is precisely why it was stopped.
In reality, suppressing press activity is a sign of weakness. If one were confident in one’s position, there would be no reason to ban the media of the other side. If you feel the need to ban the media of your adversary, it is because you are not very confident in the position you are presenting yourself.
L’Eclaireur - You are among the very few elected officials to openly take this stance, and it has come at a cost—including your exclusion from your political group in the European Parliament…
Fernand Kartheiser - Yes. I was a member of a conservative group here in the European Parliament, the ECR — European Conservatives and Reformists. There are also a few French MEPs in this group.
In many areas — economic policy, state sovereignty, and similar issues — I am largely in agreement with them. But when it came to the Ukrainian conflict, our views diverged sharply.
Within this group, there is a major Polish party, PiS. There are also deputies from the Baltic states, Sweden, and Finland — countries that have recently joined NATO — who take a particularly aggressive stance toward Russia, partly to demonstrate that they are now reliable anti-Russian allies.
I must say, the Scandinavian members were especially virulent. In fact, the positions taken by the ECR group were consistently 100 percent anti-Russian, even Russophobic. There was no stage of measured political criticism; in my view, it went far beyond that.
It became an obsession, somewhat like Ms. Kallas, who is fixated on this Russophobia — a mindset often found in Eastern Europe, and unfortunately, not only there.
For me, this was intolerable. I had explained my own position: dialogue, mutual understanding, seeking compromises, negotiating, maintaining contacts, pursuing a diversified foreign policy, speaking with everyone.
That approach was completely incompatible with the group’s stance. On one side, there was a desire to sever all relations, cut off all forms of contact with Russia, and accuse them of everything imaginable — without nuance, without negotiation. On the other side, there was my approach.
They also warned me about my trip to Moscow. I told them openly, “Listen, I am going to Moscow.” They were deeply shocked. “If you set foot on a plane to Moscow, we will exclude you from our group,” they said.
I am not very sensitive to such threats. I consider myself a fairly free man, and threats do not interest me — only curiosity about human behavior.
So I boarded the plane to Moscow, fully aware that I was effectively excluding myself. I went to Moscow at the end of May, and on June 4, I was excluded from the group for having done so.
Yet for me, this is a source of pride. I do not feel punished; I feel ennobled because I was penalized for trying to adopt a more constructive approach. I did nothing wrong, nothing bad. I am very glad I went. I continue these contacts, and no matter what further sanctions they may invent, I will continue on this path. Of course I will continue.
L’Eclaireur - To what extent can this prevailing Russophobia in parts of the EU be attributed to historical experience—particularly the Soviet era, Cold War memories, and earlier periods in Eastern European countries? Is it understandable that some view Russia as inherently unchanging? How do you assess this mindset—the reluctance to consider the possibility of change in Russia—and the deeper question of whether such change is realistically possible?
Fernand Kartheiser - I would begin simply by describing Luxembourg’s history. During the Second World War, we were occupied by Nazi Germany, which annexed our country and forced our youth to fight on the Eastern Front.
By 1945, the war was over. At the very beginning of the 1950s, in 1951, we signed a peace treaty with Germany. A German president visited Luxembourg — Heinemann, I believe — a great statesman who came to ask for forgiveness.
History teaches us the necessity of forgiveness. We have all lived through tragic and horrific periods, and one must know how to move forward rather than remain stuck in the past. We did that. Many countries have done so. And I believe that the Baltic states could do the same. After all, they were treated far less harshly than we were during the Second World War in the case of the Soviet Union.
It is also important to recognize that Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian communist parties bore responsibilities of their own — just as the Ukrainian Communist Party played a significant role in what is now referred to in Ukraine as the Holodomor. It was not necessarily the Russian Communist Party, but the Ukrainian one that was heavily involved.
Yet there is often a reluctance to rebuild a constructive relationship, a fixation on the historical wrongs of the past, and a refusal to recognize one’s own responsibility. In the Baltic states, there is much to discuss: a Nazi past, sometimes a communist past, and yet all blame is placed on Russia. I do not think that is entirely fair. Sometimes, as the French have done, one must have the courage to reflect on collaboration. There are dark chapters in the histories of all our countries, including Luxembourg. One must be honest. These events were unacceptable, but the current generations are not responsible for them.
Now, Ms. Kallas tends to construct a historical continuity between the Soviet Union and Russia. We recently exchanged correspondence on this topic — I publish much of it on my social media — but I disagree. Of course, Russia is the legal successor to the Soviet Union, but it is neither morally nor legally responsible for the crimes committed by the Soviet Union.
Again, history moves forward. I believe that whether one is High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a diplomat, or a politician, one must always try to distinguish between the past and the present. History must be studied and wrongs addressed, but one cannot attribute today’s responsibilities to past events. Mr. Putin is not Mr. Stalin, and counterproductive comparisons that have no connection to reality serve no purpose.
So yes, we must look forward. What I see now — and what I have experienced with our Polish, Scandinavian, and Baltic colleagues — leads me to conclude that their attitude must change. If it does not, they harm not only their national interests but European interests as a whole. They prevent us — French, Luxembourgers, and others — from moving toward a more balanced and constructive relationship with Russia.
L’Eclaireur - What we appear to be observing, then, is that criticizing EU policy—particularly on the Russia–Ukraine conflict—has become increasingly delicate, if not effectively impossible within mainstream European political discourse…
Fernand Kartheiser - Yes. There are now voices — Jacques Baud’s voice, for example, to cite just one case — a Swiss intellectual, a former officer, also from the intelligence services, so I feel quite close to him for many reasons. But Jacques Baud and other intellectuals — Mr. Thoth in France, and in fact many historians, politicians, and other people interested in history — openly state that the official presentation of this conflict is not accurate; it is not true.
That shocks me as well, because I have always believed that in democratic societies there should be at least some obligation to present events truthfully. Here, the official version is an outright lie, and it must be said. There are intellectuals who openly call it that.
Jacques Baud, for instance, has written several books on the Russian army, its operations, and the Ukrainian conflict. His latest book, which I am currently reading, is The Secret Wars in Ukraine, and it is very insightful. Yet he has been placed on a list of sanctioned individuals.
This is how the European Union has created an extrajudicial procedure. Extrajudicial — meaning there is no court, no possibility of defense, no adversarial debate. As a result, the European Union maintains a list of sanctioned persons who suddenly find themselves unable to access their bank accounts. They have no money, cannot travel, cannot publish, cannot trade — in short, overnight they are stripped of everything, without prior notice, without any possibility of defense, by a purely political, extrajudicial decision.
These individuals effectively become people without rights. And this is happening right here, inside the European Union. Imagine if the Russians or the Chinese did this — we would all be outraged. Yet this is the reality within the European Union.
L’Eclaireur - Do they do this in Russia?
Fernand Kartheiser - I don’t know. But let’s be honest — Russia’s judicial system is far from perfect. There are certainly problems. Yet what we are doing here, within the European Union — which proclaims itself a champion of human rights and constantly criticizes other countries around the world, often rightly so — is operating an extrajudicial procedure that belongs in the Middle Ages.
Politicians gather, decide among themselves who is acceptable and who is not, who should be silenced and who should not, and they place people on a sanctions list. There are now 59 such individuals — stripped of all their rights — plus 17 organizations.
Mr. Baud, who lives in Brussels, has told us that his neighbors are bringing him food, because without access to his bank account, he cannot even buy groceries. This is European Union policy. Opposing such a policy, in the name of freedom of expression and fundamental rights, is therefore a civic duty.
What we are witnessing is a European Union that has lost its way. It has lost the art of diplomacy. It no longer practices diplomacy at all — only confrontation. It even neglects respect for human rights within the European Union itself.
What kind of model is this? What exactly are we being asked to support politically? Reform is urgently needed. People must become aware of what is happening. I am genuinely grateful to be able to speak openly about these issues here. Thank you for allowing me to do so, because carrying this burden is extremely heavy.
People need to understand what is happening inside the European Union. I constantly intervene, I write letters, and there are other colleagues who do the same — which is good — but it is not enough, because many are afraid. They fear being excluded from their political group or losing the ability to work on other dossiers because they are considered too outspoken on issues like human rights.
There is pressure. At the European Parliament — I cannot speak for other parliaments — there is a climate of fear. Members of the European Parliament are often afraid to speak their minds. I know colleagues — perhaps ten or so — who have contacted me saying: “I would like to support you or take part in your video dialogue with Russian colleagues, but I can’t. I am told I would be excluded from my group.”
That, in fact, is European democracy today. MEPs are pressured to conform to the official line. That is intolerable.
And we must continue to fight. I am pro-European. I believe it is a good thing for European countries to cooperate in many areas and to be as open as possible toward one another. Building these European institutions was a good idea. But they are now undermining themselves by violating the very principles on which they were built: diplomacy, international relations, and fundamental freedoms.
All the principles we sought to defend when building Europe are now being betrayed.
L’Eclaireur - A Russian interlocutor once remarked: “Your freedom of expression is an illusion. You see many sources and believe opinions are diverse—but they all follow the same narrative. We in Russia recognize this uniformity and seek alternatives elsewhere.”Even in France, ideological differences across major media often appear as mere variations on a single dominant line.
In light of this observation, would you say that freedom of expression in the EU is genuinely under threat today, despite the persistence of sharply divided public opinions?
Fernand Kartheiser - In my opinion, there is indeed a real threat, without any doubt. The DSA is precisely aimed at bringing social media to heel. Traditional media already have many funding mechanisms and depend heavily on official press subsidies. The European Commission also provides massive subsidies to the media. There is therefore an entire arsenal of instruments that can be used to impose a particular editorial line on traditional media, newspapers, and so forth. Invitations for journalists to accompany political leaders are another example of influence. There are many means of pressure, including direct funding by the state or the European Commission.
With social media, it is much harder to control the narrative. That is exactly why the DSA comes into play — because the DSA, along with other legal instruments the European Union is developing, is designed to exert control over that sphere as well.
In Russia, the situation is different. Russians are aware that they do not enjoy full freedom of expression. It is not unbearable, but there are topics that are extremely sensitive — for example, the Ukrainian conflict. Certain criticisms, such as those of the army, are absolutely unacceptable.
As a result, Russians know that stepping into these areas carries real risk. This is also why they have developed various workarounds. For instance, they use VPNs extensively. Sometimes official communications are completely blocked, and they invent networks and systems to bypass censorship measures. They understand the risks — and sometimes we even joke about it. During my last visit to Russia, they showed me exactly how they do it. Pressure always pushes people to find creative ways around it.
Yes, there are clearly problems in Russia. But Russia is different from us. We claim to be free, to live in a state governed by the rule of law, a democratic society, respecting freedom of opinion, and so on. In reality, we are not. And that is the truly sad part. This is also a mission for the media and for us as politicians: to restore truth in our political discourse. Too often, colleagues deliver a very accusatory narrative against other countries while overlooking the problems we face here at home.
For me, the priority must first be to address the wrongs committed here by the European Union — this betrayal of its own values. If we speak so often about values, we must respect them ourselves before criticizing others.
L’Eclaireur - This appears to form a self-reinforcing cycle: state-supported media largely echo the dominant narrative, granting limited space to dissenting voices—except when framing them through your Russia visits, sanctions, or return. Breaking this pattern seems exceptionally challenging…
Fernand Kartheiser - I believe you know what characterises a weak system. These people are fully aware of their weakness. They know they are betraying their own principles. They know that what they are doing is not well accepted by public opinion. That is why they implement all these instruments of censorship. That is also why they subsidise the media — to try to maintain their influence against a trend they perceive as dangerous.
On paper, they appear strong. With their legal powers, financial clout, and institutional reach, one might think their apparatus is invincible. But in reality, they are fragile; otherwise, they would not feel compelled to resort to all these measures. People like me, who refuse to play their game, are seen as dangerous — a threat that could ignite or sustain dissent. And that is precisely what terrifies them.
They now realise that their foreign policy is failing. Their submission to the United States has been a total failure. They have no successes on which to build. All they possess is power — institutional power, monetary power — but it is a system without vision, without persuasive force, without achievements to showcase, and without the ability to rally people around a lifeless idea.
That is the problem.
Yet there are lessons to be learned. We are seeing firsthand how easily a democratic system can be perverted, how vulnerable it is. This underscores the importance of safeguarding it, and of opposing totalitarian tendencies as soon as they emerge, rather than waiting until we are in a situation like the present, where various lobbies try to impose their will on us through legal channels.
And one also realises that legal channels are not always the most just. It raises important questions about the application of law. Is law still truly law in the traditional sense of the word?
We are therefore in a difficult situation in Europe. But I believe this should inspire us to fight — to defend the interests of our citizens.
L’Eclaireur - So what is the solution?
Fernand Kartheiser - As I said, the system has no real successes. It is, in fact, an accumulation of failures — particularly in foreign policy, where this is now most evident, but also in the media and in various control mechanisms.
I receive thousands of letters of this kind, which circulate whenever, for example, the European Commission seeks to strengthen control over the Internet. So there are indeed networks of resistance. Many young people use the Internet every day and are mobilising.
But I believe the ultimate solution lies in elections — as long as we still have genuinely free elections. In Romania, that was already no longer the case. In Moldova, elections were also manipulated. But I believe that in France and other Western countries, elections can still be fair, just, and properly conducted.
In that case, I can only urge people to vote for parties that are more trustworthy — parties that do not pursue censorship, that are not belligerent in foreign policy, and that respect citizens rather than trying to re-educate them. It is an electoral choice.
I also believe that elections — and election campaigns — are becoming increasingly important. That is why we already see attempts to regulate electoral campaigns, sometimes to exclude parties or political figures from running because they are deemed too dangerous.
We see this in many countries. In Germany, for example, there have been discussions about banning the AfD, which is nevertheless the main opposition party. Just imagine that: nearly 30% of the population votes for the AfD, and yet there are debates about banning it. Incredible.
In France, certain political figures wish to run in presidential elections, and the judicial system seeks to prevent them from doing so. Many worrying developments are unfolding across Europe right now.
But I believe these challenges should serve as a motivating factor to continue the struggle.
Vous êtes abonné gratuit à L'Eclaireur. Pour accéder à l’ensemble de nos contenus, merci de souscrire à la formule d’abonnement payant de votre choix.
| ||||||||||
© 2026 L'Eclaireur - Alpes
Directrice de la publication : Patricia Cerinsek
Aucun commentaire:
Enregistrer un commentaire