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Censure? Quelle censure?
N’en déplaise à certains , il n’y a plus en France de censure à proprement parler. (For our non-French readers, below is a sum-up of the podcast in English)
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La liberté d’expression n’est jamais un acquis définitif. Elle demeure un combat permanent, mené contre ceux qui, au pouvoir ou en quête de pouvoir, cherchent instinctivement à faire taire la critique. Pourtant, contrairement à un discours anxiogène largement répandu dans certains cercles de la « réinfosphère », les Français ne sont pas lourdement censurés. Les pouvoirs en place ont tenté d’imposer le contrôle du discours, ils ont échoué. La parole demeure libre dès lors qu’elle reste licite.
Etat des lieux et explications avec Régis de Castelnau.
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No Real Censorship in France—But the Fight for Free Speech Never Ends
In this wide-ranging conversation, lawyer and commentator Régis de Castelnau and Pascal Clérotte sat down to dissect the state of free expression in France, the lingering shadow of the “Macron system,” and the true nature of the battles ahead of the 2027 presidential election. Their exchange offers a clear-eyed, unsentimental assessment: the heavy-handed censorship feared by many in the “reinfosphere” has largely failed. What remains is a perpetual contest against those who still hunger to control speech—and a political system whose long cycle may finally be exhausting itself.
Castelnau frames the 2027 presidential election contest in stark terms. The core issue is not programs or personalities but a binary choice: “stop or continue” the system that crystallized around Emmanuel Macron and traces its deeper roots to the neoliberal turn of the 1980s and 1990s. He sees a bloc central exhausted, scrambling among dozens of candidates for a dwindling share of the vote, and a judiciary that has at last shown signs of course-correction—most notably in a July 2026 appeals court ruling that, in his view, marked a 180-degree shift from earlier patterns of institutional support for the executive.
Yet the heart of the discussion is freedom of expression. Both men reject the pervasive narrative that France is sliding into fascistic speech control. “There is no longer any censorship in France today, let’s be clear,” Clérotte states bluntly. Attempts during the Covid era—platform deplatforming of critics of lockdowns, vaccine mandates, and the health pass—were real, extrajudicial, and largely driven by American pressures under the Biden administration rather than originating in Europe. Platforms later apologized and have grown wary of repeating the same commercial and reputational mistakes. The “woke” peak on pre-Musk Twitter, culminating in the abrupt ban of a sitting U.S. president with tens of millions of followers, represented the high-water mark of Silicon Valley moralism. That era has passed.
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French and European legal architecture, they argue, has repeatedly frustrated would-be censors. The Avia law, a blunt instrument that would have forced platforms to remove “hateful” content within 24 hours, was struck down by the Constitutional Council precisely because it outsourced judicial control of speech to private companies and imposed disproportionate prior restraint. The Digital Services Act (DSA) contains elements aimed at pressuring platforms, but French courts have insisted that the monopoly on adjudicating expression remains with judges. In 2025, three court rulings in 16 days underscored the point: speech is the default; restrictions require concrete proof of illegality; anonymity itself is not illicit; and platforms or “trusted flaggers” are not the arbiters.
Castelnau does not whitewash the record. He cites specific judicial failures that, in his judgment, dishonored the magistracy: the selective zeal in prosecuting “apology of terrorism” after October 7 (while overlooking comparable rhetoric elsewhere), the application of anti-harassment rules against critics of Brigitte Macron, and the disproportionate use of the “Paty law” against figures such as Éric Zemmour. These, however, are framed as criminalization of speech through ordinary penal statutes rather than free speech case, and both men expect higher courts to correct the excesses.
What some call censorship is often something else entirely. Platform moderation according to terms of service is the prerogative of private businesses whose interest lies in maximizing users and advertising revenue. Mass surveillance ambitions—data retention mandates justified by perpetual emergencies, Chat Control’s proposed scanning of messages before encryption, digital identity schemes—are more dangerous still, and repeatedly collide with Court of Justice of the European Union jurisprudence and the GDPR. Attempts to ban social networks for under-15s are interpreted less as child protection than as a backdoor to force universal identification and monitoring.
The real residual threat, both agree, is political and cultural rather than structural. Figures such as Marine Tondelier openly call for restricting platforms during election periods—an authoritarian impulse that reveals a deeper conviction that citizens cannot think for themselves and must be protected from the wrong opinions. This reflex is not new; it has long been stronger on the left, historically dominant in mainstream media, while digital spaces as the only outlet for dissenting views of right, far-right, or even far-left. Social media have simply dematerialized the old café du commerce, the pamphlets, and the correspondence networks. The range of opinions visible today is broader, not narrower, than a decade ago.
Clérotte and Castelnau close on a note of pragmatic vigilance. Freedom of expression is a perpetual combat. Those who cry “censorship” at every algorithm tweak or temporary suspension risk becoming useful idiots for the very powers that thrive on anxiety. The tools of defense exist: consumer-law challenges to arbitrary account suspensions, rigorous judicial scrutiny, and the simple refusal to self-censor. Platforms have matured. Artificial intelligence increasingly understands context. And the public’s lived reality continues to shape opinion far more than any editorial line.
The Macron system may be reaching the end of its long cycle. Whether electoral politics can deliver a clean break remains uncertain. What is not uncertain is that the space for speech in France remains open—provided citizens and institutions refuse to surrender it. The enemies of that openness have not disappeared. They have simply failed, for now, to close the door.
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